Moral error theory is the philosophical view that moral statements systematically fail to describe a reality as there are no objective moral facts. For moral error theorists, moral judgments are nothing but us assigning obligation and intrinsic value to natural and ethically neutral beings (Garner, 1990). One of the most influential arguments for the moral error theory is the argument from queerness by J. L. Mackie. Mackie (1977) suggests that moral statements do not resemble anything in the universe we are familiar with; they are inherently queer. So, there must be no true moral facts. In this essay, I will describe the argument from queerness and defend it against some counter-arguments.

It is crucial to note that Mackie accepts a naturalistic view of the universe. Olson (2014) also clarifies the queerness of moral statements by stating that they are redundant additions to the scientifically based naturalistic explanation of the universe. Following their formation, I will presume a secular and naturalistic point of view and will not mention the divine command theory or Platon’s idealism as alternative moral theories. 

It is possible to represent the argument in the following form:

P1: If an entity is nothing like the entities we describe by the naturalistic worldview of the universe, it is rational to believe they do not exist.
P2: Moral facts are nothing like the entities we describe by the naturalistic worldview of the universe.
P2.1: Moral facts inescapably oblige us to do or not to do an act. P2.2: There is nothing besides moral facts that inescapably oblige us to do or not to do an act. C: It is rational to believe that moral facts do not exist.

The crux of the argument lies mainly in the P2 therefore, I find it beneficial to explain the qualities of moral statements further. According to moral realism, there are moral facts that are objective and prescriptive. If they lacked one of the qualities, it would be easier to explain their queerness and avoid the error theory. For instance, if moral facts were only objective, we could treat them as descriptive facts. To elaborate further, they would describe that a behavior (or anything we conventionally attribute rightness or wrongness) that belongs in the “right” or “wrong” class, and not require action or avoidance from us. (Garner, 1990) Here, the nature of those classes is still questionable, but the queerness is mostly solved. Vice versa, if moral facts are prescriptive but subjective, we could treat them as mental states. They could motivate us to take an action; however, they would not need an explanation about their objectivity as they only depended on the person and their environment. Nevertheless, moral statements claim to be both objective and prescriptive, which makes them strange.

Before I move on to the objections, I want to clarify one crucial concept. It is widely common to think that what makes moral statements queer is the motivation factor. However, even if moral error theory is true, the (false) perception of moral judgments can motivate people into some actions. Therefore, I suggest that the genuine queerness of moral statements comes from the fact that they claim to be categorical imperatives (universally binding and inescapable). 

Ethical Naturalism and The Argument From Queerness

One proposed way to escape the queerness problem is to attack P2 and say that moral facts do not need to be like natural entities because morality itself is natural. In other words, we can find morality in naturalistic concepts. Although numerous moral theories can be considered under ethical naturalism, I will give the most prominent example, hedonism, which says pleasure is (the only thing that is) intrinsically good. This equates a natural entity (pleasure) to the source of morality. 

However, this proposition does not survive David Hume’s famous Is-Ought problem. Hume says we cannot derive normative judgments from purely descriptive statements (Cohon, 2018). Some ethical naturalists reject this objection by saying they do not derive normative judgments from nature. Instead, good is the semantical equivalent of pleasure. Nevertheless, the problem remains. It can be possible to find good in nature, but to derive moral obligation is still an issue. In other words, the gap between pleasure and good is solved, yet the gap between good and “ought to” is not. It remains questionable if a moral theory is complete and acceptable without moral bondage. 

Korsgaard’s Rebuttal: Embracing the Queerness of Moral Entities

One of the other famous objections against Mackie comes from Christine Korsgaard. In her book The Sources of Normativity, she states: “Of course there are entities that meet these criteria. It’s true that they are queer sorts of entities and that knowing them isn’t like anything else. But that doesn’t mean that they don’t exist. … For it is the most familiar fact of human life that the world contains entities that can tell us what to do and make us do it. They are people, and the other animals.” (Korsgaard, 1996). 

As far as I can see, she objects to P1 and P2.2. To begin with, her objection to P2.2, which is that there are other entities that can “make us do things,” is not very strong. The interaction between a human and other humans or animals can be explained in scientific terms. Thus, this ability of other beings is not queer like moral facts making us (actually, oblige us) to do things. The second cannot be explained in a naturalistic world and seems to require a metaphysical interaction.

Even if her argument against P1 is not very clear, I accept that it is not a logical conclusion that if an entity is queer, it cannot exist. Kassenberg (2021) also argues that the argument from queerness only leads to moral agnosticism, not moral nihilism. However, we must accept that the possibility of an entity entirely beyond the scope of naturalism existing is very low. It requires a persuasive explanation, yet no such explanation exists for moral facts. Therefore, I find it rational to not believe in morality.

Moral Practice and Moral Error Theory

Lastly, I want to discuss a major concern and drawback of the moral error theory. This is not a direct counter-argument against the queerness argument; however, it can be a motivation for not accepting it. It is the “Now-What problem.” The problem asks what to do with the current ethical discourse after one accepts the moral error theory. It remains an issue because holding this metaethical position is uncomfortable to some, as we are all raised by some moral judgments (Lutz, 2013). Furthermore, it is challenging to conceive a society without certain ethical norms. However, accepting the moral error theory does not necessarily require discarding the existing moral norms. Indeed, there are error theorists who “contend that morality is a useful fiction.” (Wisdom, 2023) According to fictionalists, we should not believe in moral propositions. However, it is normal, practical, and even beneficial to retrain some moral norms (Lutz, 2013). I agree with fictionalists and want to stress that even though it is rational not to accept moral facts, it is also rational to accept that moral practice is not easy to discard or replace.

To sum up, J.L. Mackie’s argument from queerness raises significant doubts about the existence of moral facts by emphasizing their queer nature. Ethical naturalism, one of the objections against Mackie, tries to align morality with naturalistic concepts but struggles to connect descriptive statements with normative judgments. Philosophers like Christine Korsgaard have argued that queerness does not necessarily negate the existence of moral facts, but believing their non-existence remains rational. Although moral error theory seems to challenge established ethical norms, viewing morality as a useful fiction, as fictionalists suggest, offers a way to engage with moral practice without acknowledging the existence of objective moral facts. Ultimately, the queerness of moral statements remains a challenge against moral realism.

References

  • Cohon, R. (2018). Hume’s Moral Philosophy. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved May 20, 2024, from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/hume-moral/
  • Garner, R. T. (1990). On the genuine queerness of moral properties and facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68(2), 137–146. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409012344161
  • Kassenberg, E. (2021). Debunking the argument from queerness. Ratio, 34(4), 312–323. https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12306
  • Korsgaard, C. M. (1996). The sources of normativity. Cambridge University Press.
  • Lutz, M. (2013). The ‘Now What’ Problem for error theory. Philosophical Studies, 171(2), 351–371. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0275-7
  • Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics. Inventing right and wrong.
  • Olson, J. (2014). Moral error theory: History, Critique, Defence. Oxford University Press.
  • Wisdom, J. (2023). Moral Error Theories and Fictionalism. PhilPapers. Retrieved May 20, 2024, from https://philpapers.org/browse/moral-error-theories-and-fictionalism